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PROLOGUE 
«Executives do it. Bankers do it, accountants, secretaries, and mes-
sengers do it. And the employees of printers do it, taxi drivers, waiters and 
barbers... The illegal use of inside information is out of control* 1. 
This is the conclusion reached by Jeffrey M. Laderman after his 
well-known investigation which involved 229 public securities offers 
which took place between 1983 and 1984 in New York, Washington, and 
Chicago 2. In short, he deduced that just about anyone could abuse inside 
information. 
But how does someone determine who illegally or immorally abu-
ses inside information? With such a variety of people and professions 
mentioned above, what distinguishes an individual to be an insider? Are all 
market players insiders? 
Traditionally those who hold fiduciary positions like directors, offi-
cers, and majority shareholders have been considered insiders. Could all 
employees be seen as fiduciaries to their own employer? Is it possible to 
extend a fiduciary status to family members of employees who merely 
possess confidential information? Would an individual be guilty of using 
inside information, regardless of the fact that he may not have had the in-
tention of making use of such an advantage? Instead of focusing on the 
subject of insider trading, maybe that which determines the illegality of 
using inside information is the very nature of the object of insider trading: 
privileged information. If this is so, then what particular characteristics 
would describe inside information? Could secret information be classified 
as intellectual property whether it be private or public? 
It would seem that the abuses of inside information are not due to 
the ready availability of relevant financial corporate information, which at 
times may be communicated instantly and globally in today's technologi-
cally advanced society, but rather, the problem appears to stem from a di-
sordered understanding of justice, a lack of individual responsibility, and a 
162 MARK STEPHEN MANNION 
deficient personal administration of human action. Individuals entrusted 
with material, pertinent financial data, unknown to the public, execute tra-
des in the stock market or communicate such facts to third parties for their 
own personal benefit, not considering the reality that they form part of and 
effect the company in question, the market society and the community. 
If such illicit practices have occurred, what has the legal system 
contrived to stop insider trading? Many people have been held liable for 
insider trading, but has the government been successful in protecting the 
financial markets in its task of efficiently allocating resources and suffi-
ciently generating the wealth of the nation? 
The present work «What is Insider Trading?», intends to explain 
the absence of the existence of a legal definition for insider trading in the 
United States and offers at the same time a brief academic description of 
insider trading to help the reader navigate the doctrinal and historical high-
lights of the life, law, and theory of insider trading. The historical sum-
mary of the legislative, administrative, and juridical struggles regarding 
the regulation of insider trading are principally limited to the United States 
during the present twentieth century. 
The author would like to end this prologue in the first place by gi-
ving thanks to the Ecclesiastical Faculty of Philosophy of the University of 
Navarre for the opportunity to realize this investigation Under its tutelage. 
The author is also very grateful to the Rode Foundation for its economic 
support provided for this further personal and educational development. 
Additionally, the director of this doctoral dissertation, Dr. José María Or-
tiz-Ibarz, should be acknowledged for his continual assistance and key gui-
dance in this undertaking, from the initial inspirations of the topic to the fi-
nal clarifications of the conclusion. Finally, several other individuals need 
to be thanked for their aid and consultation in the process and development 
of this work, namely, Dr. Leonardo Polo, Dr. Carlos Moreda, Dr. Hernán 
Fitte, Mr. José M. a Rodríguez Landeras, Mr. G.F. Mannion Jr., Mr. Bill 
Keen, Mr. James Bostick, Mr. David Carridini and Mr. Carlos Jódar. 
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WHAT IS INSIDER TRADING? 
A. DEFINING INSIDER TRADING 
1. There is no Legal Definition 
What is insider trading? That is a good question; unfortunately, the-
re is no easy answer. Sure, there exist plenty of academic definitions and 
an extensive quantity of administrative, legislative, and juridical develop-
ments. Nevertheless, the clamors for a legal definition that is concrete and 
complete have remained unanswered. Several battles in Congress during 
the 1980's have been attempted to forge a legal definition, but without suc-
cess. 
Any attempt to define the idea of insider trading by Congress has 
been blocked because it limits the application of the law against insiders 
who can easily claim that a legal definition does not apply to them. Con-
gress has supported its position stating that juridical decisions have cons-
tructed a sufficient parameter of principles to combat insider trading, and 
with these principles it has been argued that the Courts should define insi-
der trading on a case by case basis1. 
2. An Academic Description of Insider Trading 
Although no legal definitions have been elaborated, it is appropria-
te at this point to provide the reader with at least one, well-thought out, 
academic description of insider trading. While assessing the description 
provided as well as the historical summary, it is important to keep in mind 
two questions: Who is an Insider? and What is Insider Information? Pro-
fessor Langevoort begins his treatise on insider trading as follows: 
Insider Trading is an issue of cultural significance. Until recently, 
regulating those who seek to exploit inside information had been seen 
simply as an «investor protection* issue, a way of promoting rules of fair 
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play in the securities markets so as to retain the confidence of the average 
investor... «Insider trading» is a term of art that refers to unlawful trading 
in securities by persons who possess material non-public information about 
the company whose shares are traded over the market2. 
With this sample description of insider trading, it will be easier to 
navigate the historical, legislative, and juridical waters of insider trading, 
above all in the United States 3, which is the chosen context of the follo-
wing article. For the most part, this work will present some legal highlights 
of the past century in order to gain a broader perspective of the develop-
ment of the task of answering the question «What is Insider Trading?». 
B . LIFE, LAW, AND THEORY OF INSIDER TRADING 
1. Life, then Law, then Theory 
a) Life 
A long legal tradition has affirmed that «Life comes first and then 
the law». Reflection on the interactions between life and law generates the-
ory. And theory, in time, returns to influence life and law. Given these as-
sumptions, the underlying format of this section will be to trace a sketch of 
the life, law, and theory of insider trading. Life will be depicted by the his-
torical occurrences and particular cases of insider trading. 
b) Law 
The legal context will be delineated by legislative, administrative or 
juridical proceedings. Legislative activity is comprised primarily of Con-
gressional debates, statutes, and laws. Administrative undertakings con-
cern the rules and regulations of the vigilant Securities and Exchange 
Committee (SEC) and juridical proceedings accumulated in the form of 
numerous court rulings and decisions like the more important organs of le-
gal judgment handed down by the Second Circuit courts, the Appellate 
Courts and especially the Supreme Court of the United States. Keep in 
mind that Common Law is understood as «the law based on usage and cus-
tom and confirmed by juridical decision, that is, the unwritten law as dis-
tinguished from statute law» 4. 
c) Theory 
Finally, theory has been expressed by three main legal theories of 
responsibility, namely Has fiduciary duty theory, the equal access theory, 
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and the misappropriation theory, all of which will be described briefly 
here in their historical context. 
The fiduciary duty theory focuses upon the particular fiduciary duty 
or responsibility with which an insider is entrusted by a company. Upon 
trading or communicating inside information confided to the fiduciary wit-
hin the context of that responsibility, that insider is said to have breached 
that fiduciary duty. The legal solution adopted to help insiders who hold a 
fiduciary duty and who still desire to make transactions in the shares of 
their company is to disclose important non-public information or abstain 
from trading. On account of this «disclose or abstain» rule, this fiduciary 
duty theory is also called by some authors the disclose or abstain theory. 
The equal access theory assumes that «all traders owe a duty to the 
market to disclose or refrain (abstain) from trading on non-public corpora-
te information so that all investors have equal access to the same informa-
tion* 5. Some describe this objective as a «transparent market», where all 
market participants see clearly and equally the same facts while deciding 
on investment possibilities. 
The last of the three main theories, the misappropriation theory, es-
tablishes that any person, with or without a fiduciary responsibility, who 
has been entrusted with inside information, is liable for insider trading if 
that person uses that relevant information for personal gain6. 
2. Historical Summary 
Before starting the historical summary, it is advisable to make one 
final qualifying statement. Many authors admit the absence of a unified 
and centralized legal theory in the financial securities industry regarding 
the abuse of inside information. Part of this financial legal theory involves 
insider trading 7. Oftentimes, conflicting viewpoints and changing empha-
ses will be noted in the historical overview which demonstrates to some 
degree the interactions between life, law and theory. Kraakman sums up 
the situation well when he says, 
The law governing insider trading in the United States has develo-
ped with little legislative guidance or real consensus among lawmakers on 
what the basic elements of legal theory should be. The Supreme Court has 
split evenly over the doctrinal bases for regulating it under federal securi-
ties law. Further, the academic literature is divided on the fundamental is-
sue of whether insider trading by corporate managers ought to be prohibi-
ted at all. Nevertheless, the campaign against insider trading flourishes 
today as never before, under the watchful eyes of Congress and the SEC8. 
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a) Early History 
The concept and terminology of insider trading and manipulation in 
the business enterprise is nothing new. In the year 1696, a statement was 
made in the British Parliament condemning «conduct which amounted to 
insider manipulation and trading... which would pervert and end the design 
of companies* 9. This was one point of view, but more recently since the 
late 1800's, the popular and primordial defense in favor of insider trading 
is that it has been viewed as «a perk on the job», that is, an added form of 
managerial compensation. 
Experience has shown that although such trading often gives rise to 
a conflict between self-interest and fiduciary obligations, and thus to po-
tential liability in civil law, there are few examples of such legal actions 
ever having been undertaken 1 0. Despite the absence of legal precedents, Ja-
mes Burk in his book entitled «Values in the Marketplace: the American 
Stock Market under Federal Securities Law», shows how early securities 
regulation initiated by the U.S. Congress created the Industrial Commis-
sion in 1898 which 
recommended once in 1900 and again in 1902 that promoters and organi-
zers of corporations be required to disclose the information necessary for 
investors to make a safe and intelligent decision about their offerings and 
that the larger corporations be required to publish annual statements of 
their financial condition11. 
Citing Professor Loss, he adds that the members of the Industrial 
Commission considered «failure to comply with these requirements* as 
«fraud» 1 2. 
Clearly, the attitude of those times shows a sensitivity toward the 
importance of disclosing information. This is further evidenced by «the ch-
ronology of the increased number of disclosure requirements imposed by 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)» starting back in 1869 up until the 
first federal Securities Act of 1933 1 3 . «The list is so comprehensive it is 
difficult to find any significant disclosure requirement in the securities re-
gulations of the 1930's that had not been previously required by the 
NYSE» 1 4 . 
b) Three Early Court Cases at Common Law 
Three early court case types are cited by Professor Louis Loss, the 
author of «Fundamental Securities Regulation* and one of the most autho-
ritative figures in securities law. He presents the three cases to show the 
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development of the degree of fiduciary duty expected of the corporate ma-
nager or director with respect to and the extent to which the disclosure of 
inside information is owed to the corporation or to the shareholders. In ot-
her words, each case represents a distinct posture of the Common Law fi-
duciary duty demanded of the corporate manager in disclosing privileged 
information. The discussion of this issue will closely follow the presenta-
tion of Professor Loss due to the complicated nature and the importance of 
this idea of a fiduciary duty which is the key concept at issue in many of 
the legal decisions involving inside information. 
The questions to be answered and which can serve also as an aid for 
reflection are: Does the corporate manager owe a fiduciary duty of the dis-
closure of inside information to the company alone? Does the corporate 
manager have a fiduciary duty to communicate relevant non-public infor-
mation only to shareholders? At this point, someone could pose this last 
question: Who are the owners of the company, the managers, or the share-
holders? 
The first case mentioned refers to the year 1868 in the New York 
Supreme Court Carpenter v. Danforth (52BArb.581), and is in support of 
the first posture, also called the «majority» or «strict» rule. The decision 
states that «directors and officers have a fiduciary duty obligation only to 
the corporation and to the stockholders in their dealings with or on behalf 
of the corporation*... «Hence as individuals they may trade in the securi-
ties of the corporation without any affirmative obligation of disclosure as 
long as there is no misrepresentation... in deed or in truth». Instead of ca-
lling this a strict rule, Professor Loss describes it as a «loose» rule as it gi-
ves more leeway to act for the executives of the company 1 5. 
Other court decisions typifying the contrary extreme, known as the 
«minority» or «fiduciary» rule, come mostly from the rural, agrarian 
courts and not the city courts. The fiduciary duty rule designates that c o r -
porate insiders are held to fiduciary standards with stockholders and hence 
must make full disclosure of facts» 1 6. 
Two extremes have been presented, one which favors a loose ex-
pectation of the corporate insider's fiduciary duty of disclosure to the sha-
reholders and one which favors a full disclosure of the facts to sharehol-
ders. 
The third case type introduces a moderate doctrine, an intermediary 
position between the other two extremes presented above, which has been 
called the «special circumstances doctrine*. As one might have guessed, 
this doctrine encompasses all of the exceptions to the rules, but clearly 
does not confirm any rule. Professor Loss employs the Strong v. Repide 
case from the year 1909 as an example of this type of precedent 1 7. In this 
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case, a general manager, who was also a major stockholder, purchased all 
of the shares from the minor stockholder without informing the minor 
stockholder of his actions. The court decided that «it became the duty of 
the defendant (the general manager and major stockholder in this case) to 
state the facts (to the minor stockholder) before making the purchase*. 
Professor Loss, relating the decision with the two extremes and to the spe-
cial circumstances doctrine says that taking the loose doctrine into ac-
count, the general manager and major stockholder never would have owed 
an «affirmative obligation of disclosure*, but on account of his special cir-
cumstances of being a major shareholder, he owed the «duty of informing* 
the minor shareholder 1 8. 
Analyzing the facts of these cases, Professor Loss arrives at the con-
clusion that the result of these actions and reactions shows the «generally 
growing attitude of increased responsibility of corporate insiders* to stock-
holders because of the «status of trusteeship* which a corporate insider 
should maintain in his dealings with the shareholders1 9. Later, in his treatise 
on securities regulation, Professor Loss states that «most judges in the se-
cond half of the twentieth century seem to view the majority rule at common 
law* 2 0 which favors the corporate insider only having to disclose informa-
tion to the corporation and to the shareholders on behalf of the corporation. 
Early Common Law set the stage for subsequent legislation which 
could be used to repress insider trading, but initially the only recourses 
available were the state laws known as the «blue sky laws* as well as the 
federal Mail Fraud Statute. 
c) Mail Fraud Statute 1919 
The Mail Fraud Statute (and later the Mail and Wire Fraud Statute), 
originally legislated against fraud committed using the postal system 
(which was later extended to the telephone, the radio or the television) 2 1, 
was also wielded to prosecute insider trading activity. It states: 
Whoever having devised or intended to devise any scheme or artifi-
ce to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or frau-
dulent pretenses, representations, or promises...for the purposes of execu-
ting some scheme or artifice...shall be fined...or imprisoned for not more 
than five years or both2 2. 
Even though principally designed to convict fraudulent activity in 
the mail and communication services, the application of the law in fraudu-
lent securities transactions is supported based upon the argument that any 
negotiation must necessarily be carried out using the mail system or vias of 
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communication. The link is a weak one, but the articulation of «false re-
presentation* fits one description of the abuse of a fiduciary duty. 
In short, early juridical and legislative history centered its attention 
on clarifying the responsibilities of a fiduciary duty and protecting the bu-
siness enterprise from illegal market practices, one of which was insider 
trading. 
Along with these efforts, «in the 1920's the American vision was 
one of opportunity and wealth for all through participation in the financial 
markets* 2 3. The vision of the equal opportunity of each investor in the mar-
ket was essential because «the system rested upon mutual confidence and 
mutual exchange* 2 4 . Even though the market boomed, there were many 
abuses which led to the fall of the «golden age» or the «prosperity decade» 
marked chiefly by the stock market crash of 1929. There followed also a 
drop in investor confidence and a corresponding lack of stability in the 
market 2 5. As a result of this deficient investor confidence in equal opportu-
nity, the government was called upon to intervene under the presidential 
leadership of Franklin Delanor Roosevelt. Within his New Deal Program 
of 1933, he urged Congress to react. 
d) Securities Act of 1933 
The previously depicted market instability, and the abuses that boo-
med along with the market activity during the 1920's, forced a crisis situa-
tion and the Great Depression. To respond to these problems, Congress le-
gislated the Securities Act of 1933 on May 27, 1933 (SA of 1933) 2 6. 
Though the direct purpose of the SA of 1933 was not specifically 
opposed to insider trading, it provided a precedent for succeeding legislati-
ve affronts. It can be added that an impulse was needed to reassess the 
practices of a fiduciary in the financial industry. 
In his message to Congress on April 29, 1933, shortly before the 
SA of 1933, President Roosevelt called for financial reform within the 
context of what Burk names the «revitalization movement*. Roosevelt told 
Congress that it must. 
...give importance to honest dealing...to a clear understanding of the an-
cient truth of those who manage banks, corporations and other entities 
where the money of others is employed, that they are fiduciaries who act on 
account of others27. 
The historical situation which saw many abuses committed against 
investors by corporate irresponsibilities in the securities market gave rise 
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to a major shift in defense of the investor. The objective of the act is well 
expressed by the motto of that time referring to the new legislation: 
«Truth-in-Securities» 2 8. More responsibility was placed in the hands of 
those who issued securities. Before this legislation «Caveat Emptor» 2 9 (bu-
yer beware) was the slogan; in 1933 it became «Caveat Venditor» (seller 
beware). Truly, this was watershed securities legislation and reform. 
In order to bring about «truth-in-securities», public disclosure of in-
formation as the basis for all American law was required. The goal was the 
transparency of market information3 0. Specifically, Section 17 of the SA of 
1933, punished as fraud the operations undertaken with deceit or false af-
firmations31. It is important to make an ongoing comparison of the key 
texts of the statutes and regulations so as to take note of the continual 
adaptations. Concretely, Section 17(a) reads: 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securi-
ties by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communi-
cation in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indi-
rectly 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or 
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement 
of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order 
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they were made, not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser32. 
Before this Securities Act, as already noted above, the only way 
for the federal government to criminally process someone for securities 
fraud was in violation of the Mail Fraud Statute. The reader may have no-
ticed a resemblance to the wording of the Mail Fraud Statute. Neither «fi-
duciary duty» nor «insider trading» are directly articulated in Section 
17(a), however, in 1942 this legislative step would become the basis for 
the most effective anti-insider trading legislation yet formulated: SEC 
Rule 10b-5. 
In 1933 the general banking chaos needed additional controls and 
thus more explicit legislation was called for in 1934. 
e) 1934: The First Legislative Platform 
Created Against Insider Trading 
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (The SEA of 1934) was 
passed by Congress in order to further regulate the conduct of speculative 
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trading 3 3. The SEA of 1934 barred certain illicit practices such as short se-
lling by corporate insiders (which, in essence, is insider trading with inside 
information), reemphasized the disclosure and registration stipulation of 
the Securities Act of 1933, and constituted the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). 3 4 The SEC was formed «to regulate the issuance of 
stock and to supervise the operations of the stock exchange* so as «to pre-
vent over-speculation and the reoccurrence of the stock market crash of 
1929» 3 5. 
Despite the fact that the act fails to expressly mention insider tra-
ding, it was an important theme of the SEA of 1934 which has served as 
the first set of anti-insider trading statutes. Evidence that insider trading 
was considered to be unethical and a betrayal of a fiduciary duty can be 
gleaned from the following definition of the then Senate Banking and Cu-
rrency Committee, concerning Stock Exchange Practices: 
Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the hearings before 
the Subcommittee was the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by di-
rectors and officers of corporations who used their positions of trust and 
confidential information which come to them in such positions to aid them 
in their market activity36. 
This quote is a very concise description of insider trading perfor-
med by corporate insiders. The description of using confidential informa-
tion acquired on account of a fiduciary duty and later used for personal 
market activity is not ambiguous. There is no question what the attitude of 
the Committee was towards insider trading: the terms «flagrant betrayal* 
and «a vicious practice* leave little room for speculation. 
So the topic of insider trading and breaching a «fiduciary duty* 
were in the discussions which led up to the SEA of 1934; it may not have 
been explicitly mentioned because it was considered plain and simple 
fraud. Additionally, it is quite possible that the specific term «insider tra-
ding* was not in common usage at the time, but the practice is certainly 
under attack. 
f) Key Insider Trading Sections of The SEA of1934: §10 and §16 
The most important part of the anti-insider trading legislation of the 
SEA of 1934 were Sections 10 and 16. Initially Section 10 was not utilized 
against insider trading until the adoption of SEC Rule 10b-5 in 1942, 
which will be discussed shortly, but Section 16 was enacted primarily to 
regulate the activity of the corporate insider. There are three parts to Sec-
tion 16, each part with its own purpose 3 7: 
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Section 16a: Pre-Registration and Disclosure: 
Section 16a requires directors, officers, and beneficial owners to 
file an initial report of all the issuer's equity securities and an additional re-
port within 10 days after the close of each calendar month in which there 
has been any change in holdings. 
Section 16b: Recovery of Gains (Disgorgement): 
Section 16b states that for the purpose of preventing unfair use of 
the information which may have been obtained by a 10% beneficial owner, 
director, or officer,...any profit realized in a securities transaction within 
six months is recoverable by the issuer irrespective of the intention of the 
beneficial owner, director or officer. 
Section 16c: Prohibition of Short Sales: 
Section 16c prohibits short sales made by whatever person who 
possesses privileged information. 
These statutes are intended to regulate the abuse of insider trading, 
although the specific term «insider trading* is not utilized. It enforces pre-
registration and post-disclosure of any transaction made by a corporate in-
sider, enables the company shareholders the recovery of illegal gains 
made, and prohibits short sales by insiders. Loss, in a passing remark, 
comments, «It is interesting that the only explicit answer of Congress to in-
sider trading was Section 16» 3 8, yet, whatever may have been lost due to 
the clumsiness of Section 16 with respect to insider trading, was recupera-
ted by the subsequent agility of Section 10b developed and nurtured by the 
SEC's Rule 10b-5 of 1942. 
Section 10b of the SEA of 1934 states: 
It shall be unlawful... 
b) to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security registered on a national security exchange or any security not so 
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the commission (SEC) may pres-
cribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection 
of investors39. 
Basically, this statute grants a wide-ranging power to the newly 
constituted SEC (Commission), a blank check if you will, to «prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of in-
vestors* whatever rules and regulations it deemed necessary. With these 
words the SEC was authorized «to prescribe* rules and regulations wit-
hout any immediate limits in order to safeguard the investing interests of 
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the public. Once again the statute does not explicitly mention insider tra-
ding in the phrasing; «the enabling section was not in fact designed to deal 
with the problem of insider trading at all* 4 0. 
Many criticisms have been asserted against this stipulation clai-
ming that it gives excessive liberty to the SEC to create a «a federal com-
mon law» as one judge described it 4 1 . But what was seen as «one of the 
most vicious practices unearthed* in the financial industry needed to be 
corrected with the authoritative leeway granted to the SEC to curb decep-
tion in the best interests of the investing public and to safeguard the finan-
cing of society's development. 
If there could be any doubt on this point, one might refer back to the 
Senate Banking Currency Committee's description of the abuses of fidu-
ciary duty which took place involving the use of confidential information 
for personal, self-interested market activity. 
Under Section 10, part b, the SEC erected numerous rules and regu-
lations, the most famous of which was SEC Rule 10b-5 enacted in 1942. 
g) SEC Rule 10b-5: Heart of Insider Trading Legislation 
During the revision process of the SEC in 1941, aimed at filling in 
some non-liability loopholes in the securities rules and regulations, another 
solution was discovered. In a first person narrative account, Milton V. Fre-
eman, the head of the SEC in Philadelphia, relates the circumstances of 
how SEC Rule 10b-5 was formulated. 
Mr. Freeman retells that there was a blatant case of insider fraud in-
volving the president of a Boston-area company who was buying the stock 
of the shareholders of his company, after having informed those sharehol-
ders in a deceitful way that the company was performing poorly, when in 
reality the company was on the verge of quadrupling its earnings. In res-
ponse to this deception, Mr. Freeman narrates, «1 looked at Section 10b 
and I looked at Section 17a (of SA of 1933) and I put them together, and 
the only discussion we had there was where to place "in the connection 
with the purchase and sale" (phrase from Section 17a) and we decided it 
should be at the end of Rule 10b-5». 
Looking at the administrative and enforcement powers invested in 
the SEC by Section 10b of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, the 
Commission (SEC) promulgated Rule 10b-5 which reads: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly by the use 
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or 
of any facility of any national securities exchange, 
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(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud 
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to sta-
te a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light 
of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which ope-
rates or would operate as fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security42. 
h) SEC Rule Wb-5: A Catch-All 
Once again SEC «Rule 10b-5 does not expressly bar insider tra-
ding, but its sweeping language (which prohibits "any act, practice or 
course of business which operates... as fraud or deceit upon any person, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security") proved sufficiently 
flexible to reach most of what is ordinarily considered to be insider tra-
ding» 4 3. 
The Supreme Court would later call the SEC RulelOb-5 a c a t c h -
all* legislation due to the general, wide-ranging capacity of the SEC to 
manage insider trading, which was never intended to be more than a resi-
dual anti-fraud mechanism 4 4. Loss clarifies that the powers of the SEC 
were all-encompassing as long as the authority was applied contrary to in-
sider trading in the name of fraud4 5. To express more graphically the exten-
sive applicability of SEC Rule 10b-5, several authors have composed some 
vivid metaphors. Professor Loss likens Rule 10b-5 to «a horse of very du-
bious pedigree, but very fleet of foot* 4 6: and Chief Justice Renquist com-
pares Rule 10b-5 to «a judicial oak which has grown from very little more 
than a legislative acorn» 4 7. 
The insignificant administrative scene in the office of Mr. Freeman 
could be likened to a major motion picture which would dominate the futu-
re juridical drama against insider trading for decades. Up until this time, 
the administrative origins of the SEC Rule 10b-5 have been portrayed. The 
SEC left the remaining questions in the hands of the Courts 4 8. The follo-
wing two court cases show the initial responses of juridical action to the 
SEC Rule 10b-5, and the later arrival of the well-known «disclose or abs-
tain* rule. 
i) Precedents of Disclose or Abstain 
In 1947, two court cases provided precedent-making use of SEC 
Rule 10b-5: Kardon v. National Gypsum Company and Speed v. Transa-
merica Corporation*9. These two cases also furnished part of the develop-
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ment of the disclose or abstain rule which briefly affirms that an insider 
should disclose any non-public, material information before trading. If he 
does not disclose the information, he is obliged to abstain from trading. 
Recalling the three early court cases at Common Law, the Courts 
vied to determine which level of fiduciary duty was demanded of by cor-
porate managers in their service to their company and shareholders. The 
protection of the investor was enhanced by increased fiduciary standards, 
especially the outcome of the stock market abuses of the late 1920's and 
the catch-all SEC Rule 10b-5. 
Judge Kirkpatrick in Kardon v. National Gypsum Company applied 
Section 16b 5 0 and SEC Rule 10b-5 against the National Gypsum Company 
for having failed to notify or disclose pertinent financial information. The 
judge stated that SEC Rule 10b-5 was applicable «to directors and officers 
who, in purchasing the stock of the corporation from others, failed to dis-
close a fact coming to their knowledge by reason of their position, which 
would materially effect the judgment of the other party to the transac-
tion* 5 1. The result of the ruling is that SEC Rule 10b-5 demands disclosure 
by corporate insiders to shareholders of knowledge which would «mate-
rially effect* the judgment of the other party to the transaction. Fiduciary 
duty in this case refers to omission, a «failure to disclose a fact* to the ot-
her party which in most cases will be shareholders. 
Later in the same year, Judge Leahy in Speed v. Transamerica, also 
employed SEC Rule 10b-5. «The rule (SEC Rule 10b-5) is clear. It is un-
lawful for an insider, such as a majority stockholder, to purchase the stock 
of a minority stockholder without disclosing the material facts...* 5 2. Not 
only corporate officers and directors have to comply with the rule, but also 
major stockholders must «disclose material facts* to minority stockholders 
before a transaction. 
Having demanded the disclosure of material facts, there remained 
the need to specify the implicit requirement that it take place «before tran-
sacting* and that if there were no disclosure before trading, «one must abs-
tain from transacting*. 
j) Disclose or Abstain: The SEC regarding Cady Roberts 
In the administrative proceedings of the SEC in 1961 regarding 
Cady Roberts & Company, the «disclose or abstain* rule was first formali-
zed. The case involved a transmission of non-public information which 
consisted of the fact that Cady Roberts & Company had planned on relea-
sing a dividend. On the part of the SEC discussions, they were «to determi-
ne whether leakage of the news of an impending dividend cut by a board 
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member to a stockholder, and the subsequent sale by a securities broker, 
violated the Rule(10b-5)»". Several expressions from the case exhibit the 
idea of the disclose or abstain rule. 
«Intimacy (of those who are in a special relationship) demands res-
traint of trading in securities, lest the uninformed be exploited* 5 4. Conse-
quently any sales by the insider must await disclosure of the information, 
or, said more explicitly, the insider must disclose material information if 
that insider chooses to negotiate in the shares of the company to which the 
information belongs. If that insider does not disclose the information, abs-
taining from negotiation is the only alternative. In some cases disclosure is 
required even if that insider chooses not to make transactions in the shares 
of that company. As noted above, failure or omission to disclose important 
facts leaves the insider open to liability. In conclusion, out of respect for 
the privileged information, it would seem safest to disclose and to abstain 
from trading. 
The Commission stipulated two pre-requisites or conditions in or-
der to use Rule 10b-5. 
Analytically the obligation (to disclose material information) rests 
upon two principal elements: 
(1) first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or in-
directly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpo-
se, and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and 
(2) second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes ad-
vantage of such information knowing that it is unavailable to those with 
whom he is dealing55. 
Professor Loss himself debates the two possibilities: to disclose or 
to abstain. «Since the conflict is inevitable between the director's 10b-5 
duty to the other party to the transaction to disclose material facts, and the 
common law duty that he will often have to the company not to make pre-
mature disclosure, the director has no viable alternative but to abstain* 5 6. 
«Even though an insider chooses to abstain from trading or to temporarily 
withhold (not to disclose) the information, that corporate insider could be 
charged equally by the SEC Rule 10b-5, if there is an omission of facts that 
should have been disclosed* 5 7. 
Furthermore, disclosure properly carried out is not so simple. Dis-
closure is not limited to just notifying the SEC of soon to be realized tran-
sactions, but requests other procedures like allowing adequate time for in-
vestors to digest the information before making any decisions 5 8. In theory 
the rule says «disclose or abstain*, but in practice the only real option avai-
lable to the insider is to abstain 5 9. 
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Many authors find the origins of the equal access theory in the SEC 
proceedings regarding Cady Roberts. One author calls it «the beginning of 
a new era» in insider trading law because it was then that «they (the SEC) 
established for the first time the basis for responsibility of the insiders to 
disclose material facts in impersonal transactions as opposed to the pre-
viously held face-to-face transactions* 6 0. The defense used was that the 
corporate insiders did not owe a duty of disclosure because there was no 
face-to-face transaction. The SEC wanted to contend that the duty of dis-
closure is not limited to face-to-face transactions, but that same duty is 
owed to the market as a whole or in general, giving equal access to the ma-
terial information which would affect investment decisions of «purchasers 
on the exchange*. Described using the SEC's words: 
We cannot accept the respondent's contentions that an insider's 
responsibility is limited to existing stockholders and that he has no special 
duties when sales of securities are made to non-stockholders. This appro-
ach is too narrow. It ignores the plight of the buying public-wholly unpro-
tected from the misuse of special information61. 
The obligation to disclose information to the other party of the tran-
saction is required so as to avoid unfair or unjust situations, that is, to pro-
vide equal access and equal opportunity to everyone in the market. But it 
cannot be forgotten that these obligations of fairness fall within the same 
context of a fiduciary duty that is owed primarily to stockholders and se-
condarily to possible future investors. Within the same context of a fidu-
ciary duty, some authors refer to the disclose or abstain rule as a theory of 
responsibility 6 2 whereas others consider it a rule of behavior for fiduciaries 
or corporate insiders 6 3. 
Further analysis would be developed years later as to the theories of 
responsibility which have evolved due to the reflections undergone on the 
life and law of insider trading. For the moment though, it is necessary to 
turn to the 1968 juridical and legislative reactions to the SEC's Rule 10b-5. 
k) SECv. Texas Gulf Sulphur 
Several employees of Texas Gulf Sulphur were sent to investigate a 
possible mining sight in Canada, and while on this assignment, the emplo-
yees discovered a large mineral deposit. Knowing that this new discovery 
would cause a rise in the market price of the company, these few employe-
es purchased the stock of Texas Gulf Sulphur and also tipped the notable 
information to other family and friends who in turn bought shares of the 
company. Surprisingly enough, although these employees communicated 
the information to family and friends promptly, they failed to inform the 
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corporate directors and officers. When the news reached the directors and 
officers, it was then publicly announced, immediately increasing the price 
of the shares in the marketplace. After the elevation of prices, the emplo-
yees, their friends, and relatives, who had previously bought shares, had 
earned a profit on the shares purchased before the public disclosure of the 
mineral deposit discovery. 
The SEC became aware of this activity and charged the employees 
for having violated SEC Rule 10b-5 for having made illegal market tran-
sactions in the company stock as insiders of that company (regardless of 
the fact that they were not directors, officers, nor shareholders) prior to the 
announcement of the mineral deposit discovery. Thus «other restrictions 
were placed on situations of an ordinary nature and which would cause a 
substantial effect on the market* 6 4. 
Moreover, the case affirmed that any individual in possession of 
important information has the obligation to disclose or abstain. These em-
ployees were middle management and technical professionals, not direc-
tors, officers nor beneficial owners. Lastly, besides the disgorgement of 
profits, the two essential elements determined by the SEC necessary to 
apply SEC Rule 10b-5, were reiterated, namely, that inside information 
should be used only for the good of the company and not in one's own per-
sonal benefit, and that there had existed an inherently unfair advantage 6 5. 
Meanwhile Congress, motivated by the SEC and under the impulse 
of Senator Williams of New Jersey, was in the process of amending once 
again the SEA of 1934 to respond to insider trading abuses in the most im-
portant realm of tender offers. 
1) Legislative Reaction to Insider Trading 
Abuses: The Williams Act of 1968 
In the 1960's, the SEC witnessed many abuses in the tender offers 
market. Previous to the this decade, tender offers took place at shareholder 
meetings by way of a proxy vote of the shareholders. This procedure is 
known as a «proxy fight» because voting blocks which vote in favor or 
against the tender offer are formed by accumulating the «proxies of share-
holders* (the rights to vote of the shareholders). Later in the 1960's, the 
procedure to purchase a company was by way of a cash tender offer propo-
sed directly to the directors and officers of the company and made without 
consulting or informing the shareholders. 
Corporate directors and officers were placed in a conflict of interest 
in their fiduciary status between the actual, present owners (stockholders) 
and the possible future owners of the company targeted for takeover. In 
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most cases, many authors have commented that these corporate managers 
only sought to maintain their positions. 
As a consequence, the shareholders were left uninformed of any of-
fer by the intending purchaser. When the shareholders were notified of a 
purchase, frequently they were made privy to the offer late in the nego-
tiation stages, and therefore were forced into a situation where they had to 
make their decision hastily and with limited information6 6. 
To confront these abuses, specific amendments to the SEA of 1934 
were passed: Section 13 parts d and e as well as Section 14 parts d, e, and f. 
Section 14, which in general made it possible to impose insider trading lia-
bility in relation to tender offers6 7, is more pertinent to the present discus-
sion. 
Section 14 part e, more specifically, demands the disclosure or 
emission of material non-public information regarding tender offers. 6 8 
Most significant was Section 14e which was designed not to facilitate a 
better informed market, but to protect directors in their decision-making 
capacity 6 9. It required also that corporate managers of the target company, 
provide shareholders with a statement of the position of the company on 
the tender offer7 0. This measure assured that investors could make intelli-
gent financial investment decisions based upon available, timely informa-
tion of the pending tender offer. 
This sort of insider trading had, to a large extent, been localized in 
the realm of corporate takeovers and characterized by astounding abuses. 
Principal legislative defense against insider trading within this setting 
would later base itself upon Section 14e. 
m) What happened in the 1970's? 
The 1970's, familiarly coined the «Sour Seventies*, were difficult 
reform years in the financial industry 7 1. Due to the economic chaos and re-
organization efforts in the stock markets, little new legislative action was 
carried out directly against insider trading; it seems as though it was a pe-
riod of refining previous rules and regulations. 
One author mentions that the Supreme Court during the 1970's in-
tended to limit the liability of insider trading under SEC Rule 10b-5 by 
erecting a number of filter doctrines like the «scienter» requirement or the 
reduction of private investor legal action available under SEC Rule 10b-5 
to those who purchased and sold securities 7 2. An opposing opinion could 
be taken based upon the decision of the Supreme Court v. Merrill Lynch in 
1974, which based the prohibition of insider trading to «any» person who 
finds himself in the «mere» possession of privileged information 7 3. 
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One particular piece of legislation passed by Congress to fight un-
lawful racketeering activity 7 4 was the Organized Crime Control Act of 
1970 7 5. It is often referred to as «RICO» which stands for the initials of ti-
tle 96 of the Criminal Code: «Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organiza-
tions*. As Professor Loss points out, part of the statute states «Racketee-
ring activity is defined to include fraud in the sale of securities* 7 6. On 
account of this phrase, RICO became part of the criminal law wielded 
against insider trading together with the Mail Fraud Statute. Both of which 
have been used to punish insider traders, although in a manner deemed 
questionable and liberal to many critics. One author comments that RICO 
was designed to repress «the criminal infiltration of legitimate business 
and labor unions by organized crime* 7 7. 
Once again in 1975, Congress improved the SEA of 1934 adding 
sections 1 la and 17a. Congress authorized the SEC to establish more rules 
to regulate and to prevent off-floor trading 7 8 by members of the exchanges 
if it were determined to be «detrimental to the maintenance of a fair and 
ordered market* 7 9. For the purposes of establishing standard pricing across 
the nation, Congress «directed the SEC to establish a national market sys-
tem for settlement and clearing of transactions* 8 0. 
Late decade activity showed that between 1978 and 1981 the SEC 
dealt with 39 insider trading cases of which 27 had to do with initial public 
offers8 1. The most famous case of this sort was the SEC v. Chiarella, which 
was initiated in 1975 and was finalized in 1980. 
n) SEC v. Chiarella: A Pivotal Case 
In 1975, Mr. Chiarella worked as a printing professional in Pandick 
Press, an editorial dedicated to printing financial information. All of the 
documents which the company printed were related to public offers, but 
customarily the documents involving the transactions were sent without 
names or with false company names. Even though the names of the com-
panies were absent from the documents, Mr. Chiarella could often decip-
her the identity of the enterprises involved in the transaction documents. 
After having guessed the names of the companies, based upon the privile-
ged information contained in the documents of the companies which were 
about to transact a public offer of acquisition, Mr Chiarella then bought 
shares of the target company in the market. Using this method of insider 
trading, he earned $30,000 in a 14 month period 8 2. 
Why is this case pivotal? Because, aside from being the first Supre-
me Court judgment on the SEC RulelOb-5, upon this decision depended 
the future applicability of the three central theories of responsibility by 
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which an individual could de held liable for insider trading: the fiduciary 
duty theory, the equal access theory, and the misappropriation theory. 
First of all, the Supreme Court gave a strict interpretation of Section 
10b holding that, «in order to be subject to insider trading and the disclose 
or abstain rule, there must be a fiduciary duty» 8 3 . Mr. Chiarella had been 
determined by the Supreme Court not to have had such a fiduciary duty to 
the financial firms in which he was trading and to which the inside infor-
mation pertained. Nevertheless, Justice Lewis F. Powell did leave open the 
possibility that Mr. Chiarella may have been accused of having breached a 
fiduciary duty towards his employer, Pandick Press 8 4. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court wanted to clarify the nature of the 
liability under a fiduciary duty stating, «the allegation of fraud based upon 
silence only exists if there is an obligation to speak, and that no obligation 
arises from the mere possession of privileged information* 8 5. Possession of 
privileged information does not create a relation of confidence to the firms 
undergoing a public offer, but reconsidering the opinion of Justice Powell, 
Mr. Chiarella could have been accused of breaching his fiduciary duty to 
Pandick Press which in turn owed a certain degree of silence of office to 
their printing clients. 
The equal access theory, known for its tendency toward «market 
egalitarianism», claims that all those in possession of privileged informa-
tion are possibly liable or responsible for insider trading, even persons not 
holding a fiduciary position 8 6. In the Chiarella decision, the Supreme 
Court, overturning the ruling of the lower Appellate Court, declared that 
the previous Appellate Court «supported its decision exclusively on the 
belief that federal securities laws had reached a system which granted 
equal access to information necessary to make investment decisions*. The 
ruling continued «that neither Congress nor the SEC have ever concluded 
such a rule of the equality of information*8 7. 
Finally the misappropriation theory was anticipated in Justice Bur-
ger's dissenting opinion in the Chiarella case, which differs, stating that a 
person is liable for insider trading if, for personal gain, that person takes 
advantage of inside information entrusted to him in some fiduciary capa-
city, even though that same person may not be a corporate insider nor a tip-
pee 8 8 . 
The Supreme Court received its first opportunity to opine on the 
SEC Rule 10b-5 which called for the prior existence of a fiduciary duty in 
order to be liable for insider trading. The opinion handed down was that 
those persons without some relationship of trust and confidence would not 
be accountable for insider trading. However, the SEC, Congress, and the 
lower courts counterreacted beginning with the SEC's Rule 14e-3 8 9. 
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o) The SEC's Counterreaction to the Supreme 
Court's Chiarella Decision: SEC Rule 14e-3 
The Supreme Court decided the Chiarella case in March of 1980, 
and by September of the same year, the SEC had adopted Rule 14e-3 
which specified: 
If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or 
has commenced, a tender offer (the «offering person»), it shall constitute a 
fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice...within the meaning 
of section 14e of the Act (SEA of 1934) for any other person who is in pos-
session of material information relating to such tender offer which informa-
tion he knows or has reason to know is non-public and which he knows or 
has reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly from (an insi-
der)... to purchase or sell or cause to be purchased or sold any of such secu-
rities or any securities convertible into or in exchange for any such securi-
ties or any option or right to obtain or to dispose of any foregoing 
securities, unless within a reasonable time prior to any purchase or sale of 
such information and its source are publicly disclosed by press release or 
otherwise90. 
Briefly summarized, «Rule 14e-3 explicitly prohibits trading by 
any person (inside or outside the firm) with access to material non-public 
information about incipient tender offers»9 1. The SEC quickly reacted, stri-
ving to cover the gap left open by the Supreme Court Chiarella ruling, but 
three years later, the Supreme had its second ruling opportunity in the 
Dirks case. 
p) Dirks v. SEC: The Concept ofTippee 
The following abbreviated Supreme Court proceedings provide the 
background to the Dirks case: 
In 1973, Mr. Dirks was an officer of a New York broker-dealer 
firm which specialized in providing investment analysis of insurance com-
pany securities to institutional investors...Mr. Secrist, a former officer of 
Equity Trading of America, alleged that the assets of Equity Trading were 
vastly overstated as a result of fraudulent corporate practices...Dirks de-
cided to investigate the allegations...visiting Equity Funding's headquarters 
in Los Angeles and interviewing senior management who denied any 
wrongdoing. Later Mr. Dirks tipped the information received from Mr. Se-
crist to clients and investors. During a two week period, the price of Equity 
Funding fell from $26 to less than $15 per share...eventually forcing Equity 
Funding into bankruptcy92. 
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The Supreme Court faced its second SEC Rule 10b-5 case 9 3, where 
the individual indicted did not hold a fiduciary duty. Obviously, it can be 
assumed that the Supreme Court had taken note of the reaction of the SEC 
to the Chiarella decision. The Supreme Court had concluded that a fidu-
ciary duty was necessary in order to be liable for insider trading, and that 
the SEC responded with the Rule 14e-3 affirming that «any» person could 
be liable for insider trading. 
Examining Mr. Dirk's actions, he had no fiduciary duty to Equity 
Funding, but Mr. Secrist who had tipped Mr. Dirks on to the inside infor-
mation, had held a corporate fiduciary duty. Mr. Secrist had been an insi-
der who no longer worked for Equity at the time when he tipped the rele-
vant information to Dirks, and therefore, he was not considered an insider. 
Yet it could be argued that the information possessed by Mr. Secrist had 
been obtained as a result of his prior fiduciary duty at Equity Funding, and 
as a consequence, he could have been held to respect the silence of office 
with regard to that information. The relationship in this case between Se-
crist and Dirks became one of tipper to tippee, respectively. Then Dirks, 
having received the information which he knew was material and confi-
dential, became a tipper upon communicating the information to his clients 
and other investors, even though not a fiduciary to Equity. 
Anterior court cases such as SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur and Shapi-
ro v. Merrill Lynch had discussed the idea of tipping, so there were prece-
dents to work with for the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court also had the 
previous experience of the Chiarella case which reaffirmed the fiduciary 
duty theory, dissolved the equal access theory, and originated in a more di-
rect way than in Chiarella, the misappropriation theory. 
The question became that if the Supreme Court had already stressed 
the necessity of holding a fiduciary duty in order to be held liable for insi-
der trading, now was it going to apply the fiduciary obligation to Dirks 
who held no such duty? 
In this case, the Supreme Court extended the fiduciary duty to tip-
pees, those who commit insider trading based upon important information 
received from a tipper or insider 9 4. It seems that the Supreme Court obliged 
itself to continue basing the responsibility for insider trading upon the fidu-
ciary duty theory so as to remain coherent with the Chiarella decision95. 
From this assumption another question arises: How did the Supre-
me Court link the fiduciary duty of an insider (tipper) to another person 
who had no fiduciary duty (tippee), but who had received relevant infor-
mation from the insider? 
The situation was classified by the term «co-venture» between the 
tipper and the tippee. The tippee is made answerable to both a fiduciary 
duty and the disclose or abstain rule, if two conditions are satisfied: 
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(1) that the precedent conduct of the insider be illicit and in breach 
of a fiduciary duty, and 
(2) that the tippee may know or should have known the privileged 
nature of the information, that is non-public, or reserved, and that the tippee 
may know or should have known that the tippee violated a fiduciary duty96. 
Applying the conditions to the case at hand, Mr. Dirks was declared 
innocent because, despite the fact that he knew the privileged nature of the 
information as well as the breach of the fiduciary duty on the part of Mr. 
Secrist, he was determined to have obtained the information «licitly» from 
Mr. Secrist 9 7. 
In any case, when both conditions are met, the tippee is said to have 
been considered to have participated in the breach of the fiduciary duty 
committed by the tipper. For this reason it is termed an «after the fact» vio-
lation. The tippee participates subsequently in the breach of the fiduciary 
duty committed by the tipper who had previously transmitted the inside in-
formation to the tippee 9 8. 
Now in the wake of the Dirks case, not just fiduciaries can be liable 
for insider trading, but «anyone» who enters into a «co-venture» with an 
insider (tipper). 
The SEC from 1982 to 1985 was investigating 77 illegal insider tra-
ding cases 9 9 compared with the aforementioned 39 cases from 1978 to 
1981' 0 0 . The number of cases doubled in the second three year period, pro-
bably due to the more intensified and restrictive legislation which increa-
sed the possibilities for potential insider trading vigilance. 
One could guess whether the increase in the volume of cases was 
due to abuses which were already existing but which were not exposed. 
Perhaps the increase was due to the consequences of the two previous Su-
preme Court cases which made it seem difficult to successfully prosecute 
insider trading. Before it could have been that only the tip of the iceberg 
was showing, but later, due to the increased legislation and administrative 
efforts, the rest of the iceberg from below the water began to show at the 
surface. 
Additionally, the heightened awareness promoted by the SEC could 
have caused an increased knowledge on the part of investors as to how to 
commit insider trading. Did insider trading increase precisely because it 
was forbidden by law? Could a comparison be made between the intent of 
the government to stop alcoholic drinking during the prohibition and its ef-
forts to stop insider trading? Many questions and answers could follow. 
The duplicated volume of insider trading in the second three-year period 
remains a fact which clamored for an additional congressional reaction. 
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q) Another Amendment of SEA of1934: 
The Age of Sanctions in 1984 
«Dissatisfaction with the enforcement procedures in deterring insi-
der trading and in order to put an end to this threat to the securities mar-
kets* 1 0 1 , the SEC lobbied Congress to pass the Insider Trading Sanctions 
Act of 1984 (ITSA), an additional amendment to the SEA of 1934 1 0 2. (The 
reader might take note of the 50th anniversary of the SEA of 1934; what 
better way to celebrate it than to amend it!) A before and after look at SEC 
powers will help to better understand the effectiveness of the enforcement 
authority granted to the SEC by the ITSA of 1984. 
Before ITSA, the SEC could «enjoin any person engaged or about 
to engage in insider trading by means of a court injunction* which would 
prohibit a trader from trading based on the orders and authority of the 
courts 1 0 3 . It could also force disgorgement of profits made or losses avoi-
ded, or also recommend the criminal prosecution of an insider to the Justi-
ce Department. But the SEC could not impose any civil penalties until a 
criminal action was imposed 1 0 4. 
After ITSA of 1984, there was a major shift in favor of the SEC as 
it was empowered to impose sanctions in the form of civil penalties wit-
hout the prerequisite of a criminal prosecution. Thus began the age of 
sanctions. 
These sanctions included treble damages on top of the disgorge-
ment of profits made or losses avoided. These treble damages were allo-
wed up to three times (3X) the gains earned or losses avoided for anyone 
who traded with or transmitted (tipped) material non-public information 1 0 5. 
In addition to this, Congress closed two large loopholes stating in Section 
21a that, «the mere possession of privileged information was sufficient to 
make someone liable to civil penalties*, and Section 20d added that it was 
illegal «to communicate or to negotiate with options or whatever other 
type of derivative instruments with the possession of inside informa-
tion* 1 0 6. 
The posture of Congress in 1984 respecting insider trading is glea-
ned from the Report of the Committee on Energy and Commerce given to 
Congress in the procedural development stages of the anti-insider trading 
legislation. It reads that «the formation of capital and the wealth of the eco-
nomy of our nation and stability, depends on the confidence of the inves-
tors in the justice and integrity of our capital markets. Insider trading thre-
atens those markets suffocating the expectations of the public* 1 0 7. 
Furthermore, in 1984, an attempt was made during the ITSA proce-
edings to propose a definition of inside trading. «The Senate Subcommit-
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tee proposed the introduction of a definition of insider trading, which gave 
rise to a deep debate, but finally it was thrown out» 1 0 8 . Why was the defini-
tion thrown out? During the insider trading legislation of 1988, reasons 
were provided by Congress and will be discussed later. 
r) Life During the 1980's: RICO 
Among the multitudinous examples of insider trading, some brief 
accounts serve to show the lively insider trading activity and enforcement 
during the decade of the 1980's. 
Rudolph Guiliani, the United States District Attorney in New York 
in 1987 «dispatched fifty federal marshals equipped with weapons and bu-
lletproof vests to raid the Princeton/Newport offices in order to pursue ille-
gal securities activity. Five partners were indicted based upon the RICO sta-
tutes referred to earlier, aimed to control racketeering activity* 1 0 9. 
Mr.Guiliani was the famous U.S. Attorney who broke the nationwide mafia 
cocaine drugring called the «Pizza Connection*. Using the same RICO sta-
tutes, Mr. Giuliani prosecuted the eight leaders of the commission of the 
Pizza Connection, who were the eight family heads of the mafia. They were 
convicted and sent to prison with heavy, lifetime sentences. Later, Mr. Gui-
liani became the Mayor of New York City, after being elected in 1993. 
Another incident dealt with Michael Milken, the inventor and mas-
termind of the famous Junk Bonds, who worked in Drexel, Burnham, and 
Lambert, one of the top investment banks on Wall Street. Both Mr. Milken 
as well as his firm, Drexel, Burnham, and Lambert, were treated severely 
by the Justice Department for their insider trading activity. Drexel was fi-
ned $650,000,000 under the pretexts of RICO, and Mr. Milken was indic-
ted by a federal grand jury on 98 counts of fraud and was forced to serve 
several years in prison, along with a severe fine of $1,200,000,000 1 1 0. This 
is a large sum of money, even considering the fact that Michael Milken 
once received a year-end bonus of $500,000,000. Shortly following these 
incidents, the firm self-proclaimed bankruptcy after having dispersed some 
extremely generous bonuses to all the top level executives. 
s) US v. Carpenter: Insider Trading by a Journalist 
R. Foster Winans , the co-author of the Wall Street Journal's «He-
ard on the Street* financial column, obtained pertinent inside information 
regarding financial forecasts. In his capacity as a reporter for the Wall Stre-
et Journal, he became privy to that non-disclosed material information, 
which he transmitted to a broker named Peter Brandt. Mr. Brandt, with 
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possession of the information, traded in the stocks of those companies. He 
earned $650,000 on his market transactions of which he remunerated Mr. 
Winans a tip of $31,000 for having provided the investment advantage 1 1 1. 
Neither of the persons involved in this case held fiduciary duties 
with the companies involved in the market transactions, although it could 
be argued that Mr. Winans, as a reporter, had been entrusted with advance 
information by the companies so as to report in a timely manner, the non-
public information. «The attitude adopted by the Supreme Court in 1987 in 
the Carpenter case is significant. By a vote of 4-4, it eluded pronouncing 
the misappropriation theory as a foundation of responsibility for insider 
trading* 1 1 2. Despite the tie of 4-4, it was sufficient to convict the journalist, 
because in the event of a tie, the lower court's decision is upheld 1 1 3 . Furt-
hermore: 
To the surprise of many observers, the court unanimously upheld 
the journalist's conviction under the federal Mail and Wire Fraud Statute, 
but barely affirmed his conviction under SEC Rule 10b-5 and the misapp-
ropriation theory by a 4-4 vote1 1 4. 
«This rule required the court to hold that the journalist had fraudu-
lently misappropriated his employer's "property," confidential business in-
formation used for writing the column* 1 1 5. The author here emphasizes the 
word «property» because the information was seen as a tangible good of 
the Wall Street Journal which was used wrongly, misappropriated, by the 
journalist for his own profit 1 1 6. Newly created legislation was enacted to 
respond once again to the financial antics of the 1980's. 
t) Insider Trading and Securities Fraud 
Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA) 
Seeking the support of Congress, the SEC sought to sharpen its te-
eth in order to crush insider trading abuses. This time the focus of the le-
gislation was aimed directly at «public companies* and those individuals 
who control the persons who commit insider trading. Typically this rela-
tionship describes the company as a «controlling person*, because to some 
extent the company is responsible for the actions of its employees or 
agents. The public companies were required to adopt explicit policies to 
police insider trading within their confines and forced to assume more res-
ponsibility for the actions of their employees. Also the controlling person 
could be fined up to a $1,000,000 penalty, or up to three times the profits 
earned or losses avoided, if that controlling person «failed recklessly* to 
take proper precautions to prevent the illegal activity 1 1 7. 
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For the first time in financial legislative history, a bounty system 
was organized to pay cash rewards called «bounties», up to 10% of the in-
sider trading profits made or losses avoided to anyone who would aid or 
abet in the capturing of financial criminals «wanted» by the law. This 
sounds like a movie of the old west, where a gun-slinger seeks killers, 
«dead or alive», along with a sheriff in order to earn a living. Along with 
the «new» bounty system, the maximum prison sentence was increased to 
10 years 1 1 8 . 
Just as it had attempted in 1984, Congress once again tried to forge 
a definition of insider trading in 1988, but was unsuccessful. To justify the 
negation of a definition of insider trading, the Senate Securities Subcom-
mittee offered several reasons. 
First, because the Committee believed that the parameters of insi-
der trading designed by the judges in the courts had covered the majority of 
the traditional insider trading cases, and that a legal definition could poten-
tially reduce the effectiveness of the legal framework and facilitate in an 
undesired manner artifices to evade the definition, and second, the Com-
mittee did not believe that the lack of consent over the adequate delineation 
of a definition of insider trading should impede progress upon the neces-
sary reform of the application and sanction119. 
To define was inappropriate because there was no common consent 
as to a proper definition of insider trading. A definition was viewed skepti-
cally on the basis that the typical attitude of many with respect to the law is 
to seek loopholes in legal definitions by which to escape liability. Mean-
while, court cases continued to pile up. 
u) 7990 United States v. Chestman 
A Second Circuit court «questioned the validity of the SEC Rule 
14e-3 of 1980 in the Chestman case, precisely because it did not call for a 
fiduciary duty in order to be held responsible for insider trading which had 
already been sustained by the Supreme Court in the Chiarella case of 
1980». The outcome or effect of the decision was «the upholding of the 
SEC Rule 14e-3, but the Rule 10b-5 was further limited*. The Court ruled 
that trading based upon the material non-public information does not ne-
cessarily violate SEC Rule 10b-5 unless the trader has explicitly agreed to 
keep the information confidential, has misappropriated the information, or 
has a fiduciary duty to disclose or abstain 1 2 0. Summarizing these citations, 
the necessity of a previous, explicit consent by the trader is required, toge-
ther with a misappropriation or breach of fiduciary duty. 
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v) Securities Enforcement Remedies and 
Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 
The SEC continued its legislative push in the 1990's to combat insi-
der trading, seeking more authority under this act which garnishes the 
Commission the power «to issue cease-and-desist orders to prevent further 
insider trading, and to suspend and revoke the licenses of security industry 
professionals* 1 2 1. The bounty system as established in 1988 offered 10% 
bounty reward payments based on the profits earned or losses avoided. In 
the 1990 Act, that 10% is now based upon the civil penalty imposed which 
usually amounts to a greater sum of money to be rewarded. 
w) Recent Case History 
The newspaper headlines and their stories provide a recent update 
as to the insider trading developments. 
«SEC watches Main Street as well as Wall Street: Agency is going 
after those who get stock tips across the dining table and through family 
ties» 1 2 2 . Can «anyone» be an insider, even those at the dinner table as long 
as they possess non-public material information. The SEC has «success-
fully concluded five civil lawsuits against people accused of using family 
ties». 
Another example of family ties was exposed in an article, entitled: 
«Former AT&T Exec Charged in Scheme* 1 2 3 . «In one of the biggest insi-
der trading scams outside Wall Street, federal authorities charged a former 
AT&T executive and 16 others in a far-flung scheme to exploit the secret 
takeover plans of the huge telephone company*. The case involved a mid-
level executive, a labor relations manager, and «a web of 16 friends and fa-
mily spanning five states*. One can realize that the topic of insider trading 
is a rather serious matter when a mid-level executive of one of the largest 
companies in the world has the wherewithal, the money, and the means, to 
takeover a company with thousands of employees. 
Another case of interest is entitled: «Manager Censured, Another 
Charged*. The article states, «Another top-performing mutual fund mana-
ger has been censured for stock trades in his personal account... fined 
$20,000 in a settlement with the SEC, forced to relinquish $5,300 in tra-
ding profits, and forced to forgo his 1994 bonus and stock options worth 
$200,000» 1 2 4. The article begins referring to «another» which gives the im-
pression that this incident is becoming common. The SEC is clearly ma-
king use here of its powers granted by previous legislation, but the ques-
tion many people are asking themselves is: Are people stopping their 
insider trading activity or increasing it? 
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More recently an article was published in the Chicago Tribune sig-
naling: «Insider-trading prosecution theory not fully in place» 1 2 5 . The arti-
cle describes how a California psychotherapist, Mr. Cooper, received insi-
de information from a company executive during marriage counseling 
sessions about merger negotiations between Lockheed and Martin Mariet-
ta Corporation, and with that privileged information obtained, he commu-
nicated it to a friend, and together they bought common stock in the Lock-
heed Corporation earning a nice profit on the transaction. «Under a legal 
doctrine known as the misappropriation theory, Mr. Cooper violated secu-
rities laws because he stole information from a person who had assumed 
his trust and discretion, and then used the information to trade on the stock 
market*. 
The article continues explaining that the misappropriation theory is 
not accepted equally as a legal doctrine by all States and that neither has 
the Supreme Court fully condoned such a theory. Unfortunately for Mr. 
Cooper, the article states, that California unlike other states has endorsed 
the misappropriation theory, and therefore, he was obliged to plead guilty. 
Another case is mentioned in the same article about a West Virginia 
state official who was declared innocent of insider trading because the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit in Richmond, Va., contrary to 
four other Courts of Appeal, rejected the misappropriation theory. The 
West Virginia state official bought stock in a company just before awar-
ding it a state contract, but since he had no obligation to the company in 
which he bought the stock, he was not liable for insider trading. Despite 
the fact that the Supreme Court has never ruled conclusively on the misap-
propriation theory, Colleen Mahoney, the SEC's deputy director of enfor-
cement, said that the federal agency has no intentions of withdrawing its 
support from the misappropriation theory. 
Finally, the most recent case summarized here depicts the current 
situation and attitudes with regards to insider trading. The title of the arti-
cle is «The Return of Insider Trading: It 's the 1980s all over again —only 
worse— and the top cop on the beat can't stop it» 1 2 6 . The top cop referred 
to in the title is SEC Chairman'Arthur Levitt who is quoted as having told 
a gathering of NASD officials and stockbrokers in Washington, «We have 
every right to be proud of the industry that has been so good to us, and is so 
good for America. But we must also be realistic about its problems. Funda-
mental to our markets is investor confidence that they are fair, that they are 
open, and that they are level. And lately, that reputation stands threate-
ned*. 
A number of recent insider trading cases are depicted in the article 
showing that insider trading activity is vibrant, but one of the most inte-
resting facts presented is that, despite all of the budget reforms and cost 
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reductions taking place, the SEC will be proportioned an additional 
$250,000,000 for enforcement-related costs through the year 2001. Per-
haps here there could be found one answer to the question: Who gets hurt 
by insider trading? The article ends citing a Wall Street professional's 
opinion of the present situation and the SEC's role : «The SEC tries to do 
its best. But I really believe they don' t understand what 's happening. 
Crime on Wall Street has gotten out of control. The inmates are now run-
ning the prison. There is nowhere else in the world that you can steal so 
much money so fast and never get caught». 
C. CONCLUDING THE LIFE, LAW AND THEORY ANALYSES 
Having made this brief synopsis of the life, law, and theory of insi-
der trading in the United States, the theoretical and practical struggles bet-
ween the administrative, legislative, and judicial sources of law have been 
observed. With this in mind, as well as the continuing absence of a concre-
te legal definition of insider trading, it should render the lack of a unified 
legal theory of responsibility for insider trading at least somewhat more 
understandable. The task of this article was to take stock of the primary 
historical events of the market related to insider trading as well as to situa-
te the three primary theories of responsibility for insider trading which 
have been developed by academics in an historical context. 
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